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Abstract
The author tries to discuss women's freedom from want after armed conß icts, 
she analyzes in particular reference to the inclusion of economic, social and 
cultural rights in transitional justice. This article aims to contribute to the 
analysis of civil society actors in their relationship with conß ict and gender 
in order to foster understanding of the complex interactions between civil 
society, the invocation of human rights, and conß ict dynamics. It starts 
with the assertion that transitional justice is an essentially discursive and 
deÞ nitional project. The article discusses on different sections. In the third 
section, it suggests four avenues for civil society and donors to positively 
inß uence the prospects of transitional justice to foster gender equality, 
and the concluding section brieß y refers to the existing framework of the 
EU relating to transitional justice and gender.
1. Introduction
Countries emerging from conß ict and other situations of violence increasingly 
choose to establish a variety of mechanisms to respond to systematic or widespread 
human rights abuses. Women and girls have often been disproportionally affected 
by the effects and consequences of violent conß ict. This paper deals with gender in 
transitional justice from the lens of women’s “freedom from want”, that is, women’s 
enjoyment of basic economic, social and cultural human rights (ESCR), such as the 
right to freedom from hunger, and the right to non-discriminatory access to health-
care, housing or work.
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In recent years, progress has been made in including gender considerations in 
approaches dealing with a violent past. Two of the most well-known transitional 
justice mechanisms – criminal prosecutions and truth commissions – have paid 
increased attention to gender and there is a growing recognition of gender-crimes 
within international criminal law. 
However, the current approaches to dealing with gender issues in transitional justice 
suffer from important limitations. This paper focuses on one of them. It outlines the 
consequences of limiting transitional justice strategies to civil and political rights 
in so far as gender dimensions of the conß ict are concerned. The article argues 
that by narrowly focusing on violations of civil and political rights, transitional 
justice mechanisms gloss over important gender dimensions of the past conß ict. 
Conß icts, their termination, as well as efforts of transitional justice are gendered. As 
Bell and O’Rourke argue, “matters that address underlying issues of discrimination, 
domination and improvement of physical, social and legal security particularly with 
regard to gender, are often addressed as secondary, or not at all.”1 If it is true that 
women and girls are disproportionately affected by violations of ESCR – both during 
armed conß ict and in peacetime – donor agencies, human rights organisations 
and governmental authorities must be convinced that narrow conceptions of 
what constitute human rights violations fail to meaningfully deal with women’s 
experiences in conß ict.
The prevailing model of transitional justice has been based on the assumption that 
transitional justice mechanisms would primarily, or exclusively, address violations 
of civil and political rights. The neglect of ESCR has important, but so far overlooked 
implications for the way transitional justice has addressed the manifold experiences 
of women in armed conß ict. For instance, Tafadzwa Pasipanodya has argued how, 
in her view, the past conß ict in Nepal can only be addressed meaningfully if the 
marginalization of women is addressed and if the protection of their economic, 
social and cultural rights is enhanced.2
Recently, voices have grown louder that transitional justice should no longer 
marginalize ESCR.3 The gender implications of such an inclusion have not yet fully 
1  Christine Bell and Catherine O'Rourke, "Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An Introductory 
Essay," International Journal of Transitional Justice 1, no. 1 (2007): 25 and 30.
2  Tafadzwa Pasipanodya, "A Deeper Justice: Economic and Social Justice as Transitional Justice in Nepal," 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008).
3  See for instance C. Chinkin. "The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Post Conß ict." http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/Paper_Protection_ESCR.pdf, (last accessed 14 August 2012). 
See also the folllowing book which is freely available on the Internet for download: P. de Greiff and R. Duthie, 
Transitional Justice and Development: Making Connections (New York: Social Science Research Council, 
2009). Available at: http://www.ssrc.org/publications/view/1ED88247-585F-DE11-BD80-001CC477EC70/ 
(accessed 31 August 2012)
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been explored. I hope to show that the debate on including ESCR in transitional 
justice can be linked with efforts to enhance gender equality. I suggest that civil 
society groups and their supporters could make a valuable contribution to improving 
both transitional justice as well as the fate of women and girls if they insist that 
transitional strategies not sideline considerations of ESCR. 
This article aims to contribute to the analysis of civil society actors in their relationship 
with conß ict and gender in order to foster understanding of the complex interactions 
between civil society, the invocation of human rights, and conß ict dynamics. It 
starts with the assertion that transitional justice is an essentially discursive and 
deÞ nitional project. Civil society groups face considerable opportunities, but also 
responsibilities, when they inß uence the design of transitional justice strategies. 
Human rights norms – or rather the way they are invoked and perceived – delineate the 
acceptable from the unacceptable.4 The way the vocabulary of international human 
rights law is used by transitional justice actors carries important consequences for 
shaping the narrative of the past conß ict. By focusing on civil and political rights, 
the implicit message is that other human rights violations and inequalities were 
not relevant for addressing the past and for the project of building a new societal 
contract, but merely factors of contextual background. The article aims to suggest 
how civil society actors’ inß uence on positively affecting gender equality can be 
enhanced. I hope to convince the reader that civil society groups aiming at gender 
equality in post-conß ict or conß ict-ridden societies may potentially advance their 
goals by paying increased attention to the inclusion of ESCR in transitional justice 
processes. If persuaded by this analysis, civil society organisations that lobby for 
the meaningful inclusion of ESCR in transitional justice processes deserve to be 
encouraged and supported in their endeavours.
The article proceeds as follows: Section I deÞ nes key terms used in this paper and 
introduces the idea of viewing transitional justice as a deÞ nitional project. Section II 
outlines how the prevailing approaches of transitional justice have so far dealt with 
a) gender and b) ESCR. It argues that the neglect of ESCR in transitional justice may 
have negative consequences for women and girls. Section III suggests four avenues 
for civil society and donors to positively inß uence the prospects of transitional 
justice to foster gender equality. The concluding section will also brieß y refer to the 
existing framework of the EU relating to transitional justice and gender.
2. Transitional Justice as a DeÞ nitional Project
Before deÞ ning key terms, it is important to mention a limitation of this paper. It 
has been written based exclusively on secondary sources. This essay is mainly 
4 Emily Pia and Thomas Diez, "Conß ict and Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework," SHUR Working Paper 01/07 
(2007): 19.
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concerned with silence, i.e. the marginalisation of the voices of women and girls 
affected by manifold inequalities. While the paper aims to support these voices, it 
does not automatically speak for them. The voices of those most concerned by the 
topics discussed in this paper are only present as far as they are moderated by those 
who reported about them in the secondary literature. It is crucial that any proposals 
made in this paper should be seen as proposals for reß ection and not as ready-
made action plans. Any sound planning of outside actors’ involvement in a (post-) 
conß ict environment should be preceded by contextual analysis, the collection of 
baseline data and most importantly, by a meaningful consultation of those who will 
be affected by the measures.
2.1 Transitional Justice
In the last few decades, transitional justice has become a global project. The term 
transitional justice has gained increased attention, but has not been conclusively 
deÞ ned. There is a general agreement that the central goals of transitional justice 
can be summarised as “coming to terms with the past in a way that helps to chart a 
future that moves beyond that past”.5 Transitional justice is rationalised as both an 
attempt to deal with the past as well as one of building a more just future. The literature 
often analyses transitional justice according to its institutional mechanisms.6 
The following four mechanisms are often mentioned: criminal prosecutions, truth 
commissions, reparations programs and institutional reform/vetting (lustration). 
Criminal prosecutions and truth commissions are undoubtedly the most well-known 
mechanisms. Reparations can encompass individual, collective, and material as well 
as symbolic aspects. Reparations are often the most tangible aspect of transitional 
justice, but past experience has shown that there are often too many promises and 
too little implementation. Vetting programs, i.e., the exclusion from public service 
of individuals responsible for abuse, are the mechanism of transitional justice for 
which the least analysis has been done.7 
Transitional justice commonly pursues goals such as establishing the truth, 
providing reparations for harm suffered, restoring the victim’s dignity, ensuring that 
perpetrators are held accountable, facilitating national reconciliation, reforming 
and legitimising state institutions, and preventing future abuses. It is important 
5  Marta Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness (Beacon Press Boston, 1998), 2. See also International 
Center for Transitional Justice, "What is Transitional Justice?," http://ictj.org/sites/default/Þ les/ICTJ-Global-
Transitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf (accessed 31 August 2012).
6  See Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 2. or Neil J. Kritz and Nelson Mandela, Transitional justice : 
How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes. (Washington, DC: USIP, 1995). And Priscilla Hayner, 
Unspeakable Truths : Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions, (New York: Routledge, 2002).
7 But see: U. N. OfÞ ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conß ict States: 
Vetting: An Operational Framework, (Geneva: UN, 2006). and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, Justice as Prevention: 
Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies, ed. Pablo De Greiff (New York: Social Science Research 
Council, 2007). 
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to note that the relationship between different goals may not necessarily always 
be harmonious, and much depends on how and by whom the (conscious or 
unconscious, explicit or implicit) decisions to emphasize one or another goal are 
made. Minow argues that the different mechanisms of transitional justice and 
the way they are designed have their respective strengths and weaknesses.8 For 
instance, criminal prosecutions are better placed to deliver criminal accountability 
than to establish the truth about the complexities of the past conß ict. On the other 
hand, truth commissions may be well placed to give a voice to previously silenced 
parts of society or to make recommendations to address a wide range of issues. 
In addition, each of the mechanisms can be tailored in multiple ways, and, two 
different truth commissions may be designed with entirely different priorities. The 
recent literature has stressed that much depends on how the various mechanisms 
of transitional justice are combined and whether they successfully complement 
each other.9
This essay identiÞ es possibilities of inß uencing how the emphases of transitional 
justice are set by focusing on the scope of the subject matter of transitional justice: 
the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law to be investigated 
by transitional justice. The contemporary human rights law framework is broad, and 
just invoking ‘human rights’ does not tell us a lot about which and whose rights we 
are speaking. Hence, transitional justice is not only an endeavour to foster the rule of 
law, to defeat impunity or to build or strengthen legitimate democratic institutions. 
In Miller’s words, transitional justice “also serves to narrate conß ict and peace, voice 
and silence, tolerable structural violence and intolerable physical atrocity.”10 By 
designing the parameters of what will be investigated by transitional justice, who 
deserves punishment for which crimes, and who deserves recognition as victims, 
transitional justice deÞ nes or re-deÞ nes the narrative on the past abuses. This 
constructivist reading of transitional justice is the basis for the recommendations of 
this paper and for the acknowledgement of the power of civil society organisations 
to shape the discourse on the past and hence the future. In other words, by including 
ESCR in the analysis of a transitional justice mechanism, the implicit message is that 
violations of ESCR are as unacceptable as other human rights violations. This has 
particular relevancy for women and girls who are often disproportionally affected by 
denials and discriminations with regard to ESCR-related issues, such as in accessing 
land tenure, property, education or healthcare. 
8 Marta Minow, "The Hope for Healing: What can Truth Commissions do?," in Truth V. Justice: The Morality of 
Truth Commissions, ed. R. Robert and D. Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
9 U. N. OfÞ ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conß ict States: Truth 
Commissions, (Geneva: UN, 2006), 2. The same is stated in all other Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conß ict States 
of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
10 Zinaida Miller, "Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the 'Economic' in Transitional Justice," International Journal 
of Transitional Justice (2008): 267.
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2.2 Gender
For the purpose of this paper, gender is understood as a set of norms and 
practices constructed in a speciÞ c location and time, shaping individual, symbolic 
and structural subjectivities.11 Gender refers to the socially constructed roles, 
behaviour, activities and attributes that a particular society considers appropriate 
for men and women.12 Feminist scholarship has criticized the human rights 
movement’s emphasis on civil and political rights.13 The most important criticisms 
can be summarised under two headings: Þ rst, feminists have argued that the 
human rights movement neglected abuses occurring in the private sphere (abuses 
by non-state actors such as domestic violence) and second, that the human rights 
movement neglected ESCR to the detriment of women’s experiences. This paper 
takes these feminist critiques to the Þ eld of transitional justice. Since gender is not 
an ontological given, the narrative of conß ict can be expected to be inß uenced by 
the way a transitional justice strategy deals with gender issues.14
2.3 ESCR
Contemporary human rights law deÞ nes ESCR as those human rights that relate 
to economic, social, and cultural conditions necessary to living a life with dignity. 
ESCR are contained within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a range 
of international treaties, and international customary law. The widely ratiÞ ed 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) includes the 
rights to education, adequate housing, food, work, the highest attainable standard 
of health, as well as cultural rights.15 Whether in armed conß ict or in peacetime, the 
enjoyment of ESCR is often unequal within a society. According to the drafters of the 
Montreal Principles on Women's ESCR, a set of non-binding principles established by 
experts in 2002, “[t]he systems and assumptions which cause women’s inequality 
in the enjoyment of ESCR are often invisible because they are deeply embedded 
in social relations, both public and private, within all States. Acknowledging this 
systemic and entrenched discrimination is an essential step in implementing 
guarantees of non-discrimination and equality.”16 This statement guides the 
11 Cordula Reiman, "All you Need is Love and What About Gender? Engendering Burton's Human Needs Theory," 
Centre for Conß ict Resolution, Working Paper Series 10, cited in Diana Copper, "Conß ict and Human Rights: A 
Gender Analysis," SHUR Working Paper 02/07 (2007): 2.
12 World Health Organization, "Health Topics: Gender," http://www.who.int/topics/gender/en/ (accessed 31 
August 2012).
13 See for instance: Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law : A Feminist 
Analysis, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000). Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical 
Reß ections on the" Postsocialist" Condition (Routledge, 1997).
14 For a more detailed and sociological analysis, see Diana Copper, "Conß ict Society and Human Rights. A Gender 
Analysis," SHUR Working Paper 04/07 (2007): 4.
15 "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by General Assembly resolution 
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976."
16 In December 2002, experts met in Montréal to adopt a set of non-binding principles to guide the implementation 
of the guarantees of non-discrimination and equal exercise and enjoyment of ESCR. "Montreal Principles on 
Women's Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 3 (2004).
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following sections of this article--arguing that the need to acknowledge systematic 
and entrenched gender discrimination should be taken into account in designing 
transitional justice processes. 
3. Tacking Stock: How Transitional Justice has so far dealt with 
Gender and with ESCR
It is important to keep in mind that this section distils a general picture of the 
“traditional” approach of transitional justice to gender and ESCR, but it is clear that 
transitional justice experiences have widely varied across space and time. It should 
also be noted that women’s experiences differ depending on geography, ethnicity, 
social class, and other factors. At the same time, even in 2009, the year of the 30th 
anniversary of the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), gender inequalities continue to be a problem concerning 
most, if not all, parts of the world.17 
3.1 Transitional Justice and Gender
Women’s agency in armed conß ict has been signiÞ cantly overlooked. Women 
have most often not been viewed as active shapers, interest holders, brokers and 
participants of the conß ict.18 If they have not been totally overlooked, they have 
been conceived as care-takers, victims or passive ‘beneÞ ciaries’ of outside aid. In 
the last decade, some important progress has been made, but new challenges and 
disappointments have emerged. 
3.1.1 Progress made
At the UN, harm inß icted on women has been explicitly recognised in a number 
of high-level documents. At the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, 
governments adopted the Beijing Declaration expressing their determination “to 
advance the goals of equality, development and peace for all women everywhere in 
the interest of all humanity”.19 The 2004 Secretary General’s Report on the Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice identiÞ es addressing women’s ex periences of domestic 
violence as priority for “Þ lling the rule of law vacuum”.20 In 2000, the Security Council 
adopted landmark resolution 1325, calling all parties to armed conß ict to “take 
special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence in armed 
17 "Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), adopted 18 December 
1979, entered into force 3 September 1981, A/RES/34/180," United Nations General Assembly.
18 While this paper focuses on the suffering of women situations of conß ict and violence, the role of women 
as perpetrators of human rights violations has been even more strikingly overlooked. See African Rights, 
Rwanda, Not so Innocent : When Women Become Killers (London: African Rights, 1995).
19 UN World Conference on Women, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 4-15 September 
1995), A/CONF.177/20 (1990), para. 18.
20 "The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conß ict and Post-Conß ict Societies," Report of the Secretary-
General, S/2004/616, August (2004): see for instance para. 15.
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conß ict.”21 Less than a year ago, the Council adopted resolution 1820, recognising 
rape as a weapon in war and urging the Secretary-General and his Envoys to invite 
women to participate in discussions pertinent to the prevention and resolution of 
conß ict, the maintenance of peace and security, and post-conß ict peacebuilding.22
Efforts to include gender considerations in transitional justice have been mostly 
centred at the level of criminal prosecutions. There is no doubt that international 
humanitarian law pertains to gender-based violence in armed conß ict.23 International 
tribunals today acknowledge that rape and other forms of sexual violence can 
constitute genocide,24 crimes against humanity, or war crimes. They hence belong 
to the most serious international crimes. In 2001, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sentenced three men for their abuse of women at 
a "rape camp" in Bosnia. This landmark decision analysed in detail the international 
humanitarian law pertaining to sexual violence.25 In the Furundzija decision, the 
ICTY also held that rape is a form of torture.26 The tribunal also adapted the rules 
of evidence speciÞ cally to limit the extent to which consent could be presented as 
a defence to sexual assault.27 The ICTY created the position of a legal advisor for 
gender-related crimes and special procedural protections have been introduced 
to take into account the particular difÞ culties related to gender-related crimes. 
The number of female staff in international tribunals has increased. In addition, 
the prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone has made sexual violence one 
of the court’s priorities. A few months ago, members of the Revolutionary United 
Front were convicted for the crime of forced marriage.28 With the adoption of the 
International Criminal Court’s statute, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, sexual persecution, enslavement, forced sterilisation and sexual 
violence are today explicitly recognised as war crimes or crimes against humanity.29 
As far as truth commissions are concerned, most early commissions’ mandates 
have not explicitly included gender considerations. Despite this omission, women’s 
21 S/Res/1325(2000), para. 10.
22 S/Res/1820(2008).
23 For an early article on the subject, see Theodor Meron, "Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian 
Law," American Journal of International Law (1993). See also Christine Chinkin, "Rape and Sexual Abuse of 
Women in International Law," European Journal of International Law (1994)., or Eileen Meier, "Prosecuting 
Sexual Violence Crimes during War and Conß ict: New Possibilities for Progress," International Legal Theory 10 
(2004).
24 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Trial Judgment), ICTR-96-4-T, International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, 2 September 1998.
25 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic (IT-96-23) (IT-96-23/1).
26 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (Trial Judgment), IT-95-17/1-T.
27 Bell and O'Rourke, "Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice?" 27.
28 Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (Trial judgment), Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2 March 2009.
29 "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, entered into force July 1, 2002," 
Articles 7 and 8.
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advocates in South Africa for instance convinced the TRC to conduct special hearings 
on gender questions. More recently, mandates of truth commissions in Kenya and 
the Solomon Islands, for instance, contain explicit gender provisions.30 Recent 
truth commissions have also used gender hearings or have disaggregated data 
on the basis of gender. At least at the rhetoric level, there is also greater focus on 
addressing gender crimes in reparations programs. As the next section shows, the 
formal inclusion of gender-related provisions in the mandate of a truth commission 
or a reparations program does not, however, guarantee that gender issues are fully 
addressed. 
3.1.2 New Challenges and New Disappointments
Most of these concerns with current approach to gender in transitional justice have 
been described in detail elsewhere and this article intends to focus on only one of the 
problems associated with the current way of thinking of gender problems, namely 
the marginalisation of ESCR. Nevertheless, two challenges shall be summarised 
here: 
The Þ rst and well-documented problem concerns the difÞ culties involved in 
prosecuting gender-related crimes in criminal tribunals. As mentioned above, where 
transitional justice has focused on gender issues, this has been most remarkable 
in criminal tribunals. Nicola Henry argues that due to the sheer diversity and 
heterogeneity of wartime rape victims, the experience of giving testimony was likely 
to be mixed.31 It is no new story that testifying in court can create an additional form 
of victimisation for people who have suffered sexual violence.32 The tribunal’s efforts 
to render the testimony of witnesses relevant and concise may clash with victims’ 
need to narrate pain and suffering.33 In formal proceedings, a speciÞ c vocabulary and 
form determine what is acceptable and ‘useful’ to bring a case forward. This can be a 
frustrating or even dehumanising experience.34 Many have argued that proceedings 
in courts should, and could, be modiÞ ed to accommodate survivors of gender-related 
crimes.35 Others have cautioned that the main purpose of any judicial proceeding is 
30 For Liberia: Act Establishing the Truth And Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, (May 12, 2005), Sections 
4 a) and e). Kenya: The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Bill, (signed into law on November 
28, 2008), Sections 2 and 5c. Solomon Islands: Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, 
Sections 2c, 3a and 6(4).
31 Nicola Henry, "Witness to Rape: The Limits and Potential of International War Crimes Trials for Victims of 
Wartime Sexual Violence," International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2009).
32 Katherine Franke, "Gendered Subject of Transitional Justice," Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 15, no. 3 
(2006): 820.
33 Ibid.: 819.
34 Ibid.: 818. 
35 Kelly Askin, War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals (The Hague: Nijhoff 
Publishers , 1997). Rhonda Copelon, "Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into 
International Criminal Law," McGill Law Journal 46 (2000). B Bedont and K Hall-Martinez, "Ending Impunity for 
Gender Crimes under the International Criminal Court," Brown Journal of World Affairs 6 (1999).
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to decide on the binary question of legal guilt or innocence and to establish larger 
societal principles rather than to provide individual recognition or even healing.36 In 
any event, it seems fair to conclude that even in the best of all cases, when a tribunal 
is most sensitive to gender issues, it will only succeed in recognising women as 
victims of sexual violence if the women coming before the judges conform their 
experience to a set of legal vocabulary and pre-determined stages of process. In 
addition, progressive jurisprudential developments are often insigniÞ cant advances 
for the society and individuals most directly concerned by the crimes. For instance, 
the Akayesu trial at the ICTR was a break-through in accepting sexual violence as an 
element of genocide, but the vast majority of cases were decided before the gacaca 
tribunals, where little or no effects of the ICTR’s holding could be felt.37
The second concern with the current approaches to gender in transitional justice 
is their narrow focus on direct sexual violence. This concern is the starting point for 
my argument that transitional justice should address violations of ESCR in order 
to more fully take into account women’s experiences in conß ict. It is important 
not to limit gender issues to the incidence of direct sexual violence, although 
this has unfortunately been a devastating characteristic of many conß icts. It is 
very rare for criminal tribunals to deal with gender-based violations as anything 
other than direct sexual violence against women. Recent truth commissions with 
mandates on gender-related abuses have also tended to focus on direct sexual 
violence, understood to include inter alia, rape, sexual slavery, forced sterilisation. 
Addressing women’s suffering exclusively through the lens of direct sexual violence 
however ignores the gendered dimensions of conß ict and the obvious fact that 
women can also suffer any other human rights violations else than direct sexual 
violence. Moreover, it is well-known that men can also suffer gendered violence.38 
Nevertheless, there is a tendency to limit the analysis to direct sexual violence. As 
an acute illustration, the Þ rst volume of the Þ nal report of the Liberian TRC has dealt 
with women’s experiences from the implicit assumption that when women suffered, 
it was necessarily from direct sexual violence.39 By narrowly conceptualising harm 
suffered by women as relating to direct sexual violence, the Commission deals 
exclusively with the civil and political dimensions of women’s rights violations. Even 
36 Rosalind Dixon, "Rape as a Crime in International Humanitarian Law: Where to from Here?," European Journal 
of International Law 13, no. 3 (2002). See also Minow, "The hope for healing: what can truth commissions 
do?," 238.
37 Franke, "Gendered Subject of Transitional Justice," 820.
38 Ibid.: 823.. See also: ESCR-Net, "Report from the Women and ESCR Working Sessions," in Challenging Poverty 
and Inequality through Human Rights: International Strategy Meeting on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and ESCR-NET (Nairobi, 2008), 2. 
39 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, "Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of Liberia (TRC): Volume I: Findings and Determinations," (2008), 63. The commission states that 28% of 
reported violations were committed against women. The paragraph discussing this number seems to refer 
exclusively to instances of sexual violence. 
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if the TRC diagnoses issues such as limited access to education or land tenure as a 
root cause of conß ict, it fails to discuss the ESCR dimensions of violations; and those 
of women in particular.40 After having exclusively analysed direct sexual violence, 
the Commission concludes that, “as a group, men comprise a larger victim category 
than women.”41 
While this in no way says that we should ignore the reality of sexual violation of 
women,42 concentrating on women’s experiences of sexual violence should not 
come at the expense of silencing all other important aspects of women’s experiences 
of conß ict, in particular the long-term consequences of violations. Otherwise, by 
neglecting ESCR in transitional justice, one risks overlooking gendered dimensions 
of the past conß ict. The following section contains a brief overview of how transitional 
justice has so far dealt with ESCR.
3.2 Transitional Justice and ESCR
ESCR are contained within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a range of 
international treaties, international customary law and national law. The widely 
ratiÞ ed International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) asks 
states to “undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment 
of all rights set forth in the present Covenant.”43 It includes the rights to education, 
adequate housing, food, work, the highest attainable standard of health, as well as 
cultural rights.44 During times of armed conß ict, international humanitarian law, 
in addition to human rights law, for instance, prohibit the destruction of objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs or drinking 
water installations.45
In international legal discourse, particularly in the West, ESCR have, however, 
long been downplayed as “nothing more than objectives of social policy”.46 Many 
misunderstandings and myths persist. Whether in relation to transitional justice 
40 For an analysis of the Commission’s preliminary report, see Evelyne Schmid, "Liberia’s Truth Commission 
Report: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Transitional Justice," PRAXIS - The Fletcher Journal of Human 
Security XXIV, 5-28 (May 2009).
41 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, "Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Liberia (TRC): Volume I: Findings and Determinations," 63.
42 Franke, "Gendered Subject of Transitional Justice," 825.
43 ICESCR, Article 3.
44 Ibid.
45 "Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conß icts (Protocol I), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978," Article 54. 
According to a study by the International Committee of the Red Cross, this prohibition is part of customary 
international law and applies in all armed conß icts. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Louise Doswald-Beck, and 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume I, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), Rule 54.
46 This is even true in some recent publications. See for instance Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between 
Idealism and Realism, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 110.
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or the human rights Þ eld more broadly, there is a long way to go in translating the 
international rhetoric of the “indivisibility, interdependency and interrelatedness”47 
of all human rights into reality. Before taking stock on how transitional justice has so 
far dealt with ESCR, a few remarks shall be made on what I believe is a problematic 
understanding of ESCR. In some of the literature, commentators discuss the 
ideological dichotomy between civil and political rights on the one hand, and ESCR 
on the other, under the heading of “individual vs. group rights”.48 In other words, it 
is sometimes believed that civil and political rights are individual rights, whereas 
socio-economic and cultural rights are group rights. However, this conception is 
inaccurate. ESCR can be viewed as individual rights just as any other human rights. 
The right not to be evicted from one’s home without any procedural guarantees (an 
economic and social right) can clearly be conceived as an individual right. At the same 
time, abuses of the right to housing can affect particular groups disproportionally 
and may in certain circumstances be claimed by groups. 
Although Pia and Diez correctly explain that ESCR equally belong to the individual 
as a human being, it seems relevant to note that conceptual classiÞ cations of 
human rights have often proved unhelpful. For instance, Pia and Diez’ explanation 
that “civil and political rights primarily act as constraints on those who govern” 
while social, economic and cultural rights “stress the equality that an individual 
can claim as a citizen” is problematic. It is a misconception to believe that civil and 
political rights simply act as constraints on the authorities while ESCR necessarily 
require the state to take resource intensive positive action. As an example, the fair 
trial provision in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
precisely also derives from the idea of equality (“[a]ll persons shall be equal before 
the courts and tribunals”49). The realisation of civil and political rights equally 
requires the state to devote resources. To stick with the example of fair trial, the 
right requires the state to take positive action to train and pay court staff and to 
establish a complex institutional framework. Practitioners involved in judicial reform 
activities around the world will agree that guaranteeing due process is no free lunch. 
At the same time, ESCR can equally act as constraints on the authorities. ESCR 
demand, for instance, that the state abstain from arbitrarily evicting people from 
their homes or from limiting state healthcare to certain social groups. Hence, binary 
compartmentalisations of human rights often derive from unhelpful assumptions 
and it seems more useful to think about speciÞ c challenges to the realisation of 
human rights. In this paper, the argument is made that the failure to analyze ESCR 
in transitional justice carries consequences on the realisation of gender equality. 
47 United Nations, "World Conference on Human Rights: the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action A/
CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993," in New York: UN, para. 5.
48 Pia and Diez, "Conß ict and Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework," 16.
49 "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171," Article 14(1).
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Authors such as Louise Arbour, the former High-Commissioner for Human Rights, 
have observed that transitional justice has so far almost exclusively focused on 
violations of civil and political rights relating to personal freedoms and physical 
integrity.50 As a consequence, transitional justice mechanisms have mostly dealt 
with torture, killings, arbitrary detention, and “disappearances,” leaving violations 
of ESCR unaddressed in all but rare instances. Boraine, former deputy chair of the 
South African TRC, advocates for “a deeper, richer and broader vision of justice which 
seeks to confront perpetrators, address the needs of victims and assist in the start 
of a process of reconciliation and transformation”.51 Arguably, this “deeper vision” is 
necessary because victims’ needs are related to violations of ESCR as much as they 
are related to violations of civil and political rights. However, the transitional justice 
movement has had a narrow view of what constitutes human rights violations, and it 
is time to recognize that ESCR are not only part of existing international law but are, 
moreover, a decisive dimension of the past abuses to be addressed.
Looking at the different mechanisms of transitional justice, tribunals have very 
marginally touched upon violations of ESCR, although some limited progress has 
been made.52 To mention just a few truth commissions, in Chile, the National Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission focused on ‘serious violations’ consisting of physical 
violence under international human rights norms.53 The South African TRC had a broad 
mandate but decided to limit the inquiry to gross human rights violations which were 
deÞ ned as limited to severe physical mistreatment.54 More recent commissions 
have sometimes explicitly mentioned economic, social or cultural dimensions.55 The 
Liberian TRC for instance had a mandate tasking it to analyze all gross human rights 
violations, violations of humanitarian law and economic crimes. However, without 
much discussion, the TRC drew up a list of what it considered as gross human rights 
violations and did not include dimensions of ESCR violations in that list.56 While 
50 While it is often said that civil and political rights protect personal freedom and physical integrity, the same is 
true for ESCR. In the absence of food, water or healthcare, one’s physical integrity can easily be harmed. This 
shows that classifying human rights into different groups is not only unhelpful, but does also not capture the 
complexity of human rights.
51 Alexander Boraine, "Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation," Journal of International Affairs - Columbia 
University 60, no. 1 (2006): 17. Cited in Louise Arbour, "Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition," 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 40, no. 1 (2007): 2.
52 See in particular: "Prosecutor vs. Kupreskic et al, Trial Judgement," (IT-95-16-T, ICTY), holding that the 
widespread and systematic destruction of housing can amount to a crime against humanity.
53 Miller, "Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the 'Economic' in Transitional Justice," 276.
54 Ibid.: 277.
55 Apart from the Liberian TRC, the mandates of truth commissions in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Chad have 
also included economic and social aspects. In October 2008, the Kenyan National Assembly adopted a bill 
which includes economic rights among the issues to be investigated by the planned Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission. The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Bill, Article 5. Available at http://
www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Bills/2008/The_Truth_Justice_and_Reconciliation_Commission_Bill_2008.pdf 
(accessed 31 August 2012).
56 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, "Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Liberia (TRC): Volume I," 35.
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the report of the Liberian TRC diagnoses that the main causes of the conß ict were 
“attributable to poverty, corruption, limited access to education, land tenure, etc.”,57 
the Þ rst volume of the TRC’s report fails to analyze whether and/or in what ways 
these diagnosed root causes of the conß ict may have disproportionately affected 
the female inhabitants of Liberia,58 although this neglect was Þ nally corrected in a 
later version of the report issued by the TRC.59
As an example, in countries such as Liberia, women face greater difÞ culties in 
accessing land tenure. If a transitional justice mechanism investigates violations of 
civil and political rights, it will deal with the husband’s abduction or death, but it will 
likely fail to support the female spouse who may have subsequently lost her and her 
family’s means of subsistence.
As far as reparations programs are concerned, it is fair to say that they have so 
far rarely addressed ESCR dimensions. But advances are made, and recent efforts 
testify to increased attention to ESCR, but also to new challenges in implementing 
such reparations programs.60 
Voices have grown louder to include ESCR in transitional justice work, in particular to 
ensure the sustainability of peace.61 If one accepts that violations of ESCR were at the 
root of the conß ict or played an important part of the experiences of those affected 
by the conß ict, it is only reasonable to think that they should be addressed by the 
transitional justice strategy. Treating inequality or structural violence simply as the 
contextual background of a ‘transition’ may do harm. It may undermine a fragile peace 
and may cement the view that structural violence based on gender is nothing more 
than natural misfortune. The Þ ndings of a transitional justice mechanism such as a 
truth commission will draw the line between the acceptable and the unacceptable 
and such a body will present the history of the violent past in one way or another. 
Those who deÞ ne the parameters of a transitional justice strategy must be conscious 
of their power to shape – and potentially limit – the discourse and interpretation of 
the past; which may have important consequences for the future. 
57 Ibid., 10.
58 Evelyne Schmid, "Liberia’s Truth Commission Report: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Transitional 
Justice," PRAXIS - The Fletcher Journal of Human Security XXIV, 5-28 (May 2009).
59 See in particular the Annex to Volume 3 on “Women and Conß ict”. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Liberia, Final Consolidated Report (2009). Available at http://trcoß iberia.org/reports/Þ nal-report (accessed 
31 August 2012). 
60 See for instance the literature on the experience on the Peruvian reparations program which attempted 
to include ESCR dimensions in reparations programs. Lisa J. Laplante and Kimberly Theidon, "Truth with 
Consequences: Justice and Reparations in Post-Truth Commission Peru," Human Rights Quarterly 29 (2007). 
Or Lisa Magarrell and Leonardo Filippini, The Legacy of Truth: Criminal Justice in the Peruvian Transition 
(International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), 2006).
61 See in particular the second last edition of the International Journal of Transitional Justice: International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008).
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As this article suggests, this opportunity can be creatively used by gender 
advocates who have long argued that women tend to be disproportionately affected 
by economic, social, or cultural deprivations, whether before, during or after an 
armed conß ict.62 During conß ict, they not only continue to suffer the pre-existing 
discriminations and inequalities,63 but they moreover often suffer violations of 
multiple and interrelated human rights. For instance, a woman losing her husband 
or children not only suffers the direct violations of civil and political rights (e.g., the 
killing or disappearance of her loved ones), but often also endures dire economic, 
social, and cultural consequences by becoming the sole care-taker of the household. 
Once a peace agreement is signed, she might further be overlooked by outside 
actors who in the short-term tend to concentrate on disarmament programs which 
in turn tend to address the needs of former male combatants.
4. Avenues for Civil Society and Their Supporters
The observation of this paper is Þ rst, that transitional justice has so far not sufÞ ciently 
dealt with ESCR, and second, that this omission has important gender implications. 
The proposal of the article is therefore that in order to advance gender issues, civil 
society can grasp interesting opportunities in linking the issues of gender and ESCR 
in transitional justice processes. The last section of this article details this proposal 
by outlining four avenues for action.
4.1 First, civil society groups and donors agencies should pay conscious 
attention to the ways they help shape the discourse of transitional 
justice 
Putnam has famously deÞ ned civil society organisations as institutionalised 
associations of people that are both a product of existing power structures and an 
agent of political change.64 As Copper has outlined, the relationship between civil 
society organisations and gender is tense and complex.65 Moments of transition 
allow the re-negotiation of relations of power, and transitions open the possibility 
for recognising past injustice or for giving a voice to previously silent actors. The 
articulation of what and whose past needs to be uncovered by transitional justice is 
at the same time an opportunity to give a voice to previously silent parts of society, as 
well as an opportunity to point out the structural and long-standing issues affecting 
gender. Truth commissions in particular offer opportunities “for women to have a 
62 "Montreal Principles on Women's Economic, Social and Cultural Rights."
63 One of the challenges for transitional justice is the fact that deeply rooted gender inequalities are seldom 
speciÞ c to outbreaks of war, but that the conß ict often merely accentuates discrimination and violations 
that women suffered during peace. Fatima Ayub, Sari Kouvo, and Yasmin Sooka, Addressing Gender-speciÞ c 
Violations in Afghanistan (International Center for Transitional Justice, February 2009), 4.
64 Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern 
Italy (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), cited in Copper, "Conß ict Society and Human Rights. A 
Gender Analysis," 2.
65 Copper, "Conß ict Society and Human Rights. A Gender Analysis," 3.
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platform, to narrate their experiences of human rights abuse, address the nation – 
and reclaim the public sphere.”66 They are often tasked to make recommendations 
to avoid the recurrence of abuses and they are often one of the most legitimate and 
visible bodies to address long-standing problems. This potential should be used by 
those who wish to advance gender equality.
The Þ rst recommendation is thus simply that civil society actors should be aware 
of the inherently political purposes of transitional justice. Civil society’s emphases 
have unavoidable effects on shaping the narrative of the conß ict and thus what 
society needs to address to reach a more just future. ‘Uncovering the past’ can mean 
various things, depending on which and whose past transitional justice intends to 
uncover. As Miller explains, the “failure to include economic concerns in transitional 
justice mechanisms tend to make transition into a political rather than an economic 
story”.67 Miller argues that it is no coincidence that the genocide in Rwanda has 
become a story of historic ethnic hatred between Hutu and Tutsi rather than a 
narrative of decades-long resource inequity, unequal land distribution and colonial 
constructions.”68 In her words: 
The mandate of a commission or the list of crimes to be tried at a court means 
that, to some degree, the decision about what story to tell is predetermined, 
as is the manner of addressing the conß ict (and sustainably resolving it for 
the future). Although a government may separately pursue development 
options, the redistribution of land or other plans for economic change, the 
argument here is that the divorce of those strategies from transitional 
justice mechanisms allows a myth to be formed that the origins of conß ict 
are political or ethnic rather than economic or resource based. It suggests 
that inequality is a question of time or development rather than the 
entrenched ideology of elites, as well as that the need to memorialize the 
past does not require the narration of past economic oppression.69
Hence, if analysis shows that denials of ESCR belong to the main root causes of a 
conß ict and are a main part of women’s suffering, the idea of uncovering the past 
suggests the need to include an analysis of ESCR in the inquiries of transitional 
justice. If this is neglected, structural violence may be permitted to continue – which 
may in turn fuel violent conß ict. On the other hand, if transitional justice successfully 
uncovers structural discriminations, marginalisation and the denial of ESCR, it has 
the potential to be the starting point of a debate on how to tackle these problems, 
including in terms of gender equality.
66 Vasuki Nesiah, "Gender and Truth Commission Mandates," in International Center for Transitional Justice 
(2007).




As an example, the Sierra Leonean TRC was tasked to focus on the experiences of 
women and in particular, the sexual violence that occurred in the conß ict period. 
Thanks to the strong inß uence of gender advocates, the TRC also highlighted the 
structural injustices relating to gender inequalities in family and property law.70 
These Þ ndings were used to establish broad recommendations on how to address 
cultural, legal, social, and political factors which rendered women disproportionally 
vulnerable.71 Now, the uphill task is to ensure the implementation of these 
recommendations. Continuous engagement of civil society will be required to 
translate the gains made during the commission’s work into tangible improvements. 
But the example shows how civil society actors managed to bring deeply rooted 
structural gender issues to the surface and how the conscious acknowledgement of 
the importance of these factors helped the transitional justice mechanism to spur a 
debate on what would be needed to tackle the issues which have led to the outbreak 
of conß ict.
4.2 Second, civil society can creatively help to make visible the denial of 
ESCR
Civil society groups can contribute to make discrimination and ESCR-related human 
rights problems visible during transitional justice as well as during other times. An 
interesting and concrete avenue for action was explored in 2007 by Peru’s Estudio 
para la Defensa de los Derechos de la Mujer (DEMUS), an advocacy group for gender 
justice. To promote a process of political and legal enforceability of women’s rights, 
in particular ESCR, this civil society group established mock tribunals which aimed at 
creating public awareness and acknowledgement of existing gender related denials 
of ESCR.72 The tribunals were based on submissions of symbolic cases showing 
women’s ESCR violations. The cases illustrated patterns of discrimination or the 
failure of the state to protect women’s ESCR. The “juries” were made up of human 
rights experts. DEMUS managed to convince State representatives to be present at 
least during one of the hearings. The jury would then issue a “decision”, including 
recommendations for the State and for civil society. While a systematic evaluation of 
the outcomes of such an innovative approach would be needed before conclusions 
on its effectiveness can be drawn, it seems safe to at least consider it a creative way 
to illustrate ESCR denials suffered by women, including long-standing structural 
discriminations. At the same time, the demonstration effect of tribunals dealing with 
ESCR may help to illustrate the feasibility of considering ESCR as entitlements which 
can be addressed in legal terms. 
70 Franke, "Gendered Subject of Transitional Justice," 826..
71 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "The Þ nal report of the Truth & Reconciliation Commission 
of Sierra Leone," http://www.sierra-leone.org/TRCDocuments.html (accessed 31 August 2012).
72 ESCR-Net, "Report from the Women and ESCR Working Sessions," 4.
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4.3 Third, civil society actors should be supported to insist on reparations 
programs which are both gender sensitive and attentive to violations of 
ESCR
In international law, the concept of reparations as traditionally understood aims 
at restoring the situation that prevailed before a violation occurred.73 This concept 
Þ ts more easily with violations which are conceivable as discrete events. This 
explains why reparations for violations of civil and political rights such as rape, 
arbitrary detention or killings are easier to understand. It is more challenging to 
deal with deeply encroached structural problems such as women’s marginalisation 
in accessing education or social security. Hence, repairing the situation prevailing 
before the outbreak of conß ict may not be sufÞ cient, and including sexual violence 
among the violations deserving reparations is addressing only one aspect of gender 
concerns. More than ten years after the notion of “gender mainstreaming” was 
tabled at the 1995 Beijing World Conference on Women,74 the translation of the 
idea of mainstreaming gender into concrete action is still incomplete. An excellent 
book edited by Ruth Rubio Marin addresses the question on how to design gender 
sensitive reparations programs.75 The publication identiÞ es lessons from past 
experiences with reparations programs from a gender perspective, and it provides 
valuable insights into conceptual as well as practical and logistical considerations. 
4.4 Fourth, civil society organisations and their supporters should strive to 
increase the participation of women in the design and decision-making 
of transitional justice mechanisms
Women have largely been absent in negotiations ending armed conß icts or in 
designing the parameters of transitional justice. The argument has been made that 
changing the players will change the nature of the game, and different priorities will 
arise if women were granted a seat in the negotiations on transitional justice.76 The 
Committee on ESCR emphasised in a General Comment that the obligation to fulÞ l the 
rights contained in the ICESCR “requires States parties to take steps to ensure that in 
73 For a good introduction, see United Nations OfÞ ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law 
Tools for Post-Conß ict States: Reparations Programmes (Geneva: UN, 2008). For the 1928 landmark case: 
Permanent Court of International Justice, Case concerning the factory at Chorzów (indemnity-merits): 
sixteenth (extraordinary) session (1929), Série C, 1928). And: Commission United Nations. International 
Law and James Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, 
Text, and Commentaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Articles 33-37. For the analysis on 
reparations in transitional justice contexts, see The Handbook of Reparations, ed. Pablo De Greiff (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
74 UN World Conference on Women, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 4-15 September 
1995), A/CONF.177/20 
75 Ruth Rubio-Marín, What Happened to the Women? : Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations, 
Advancing Transitional Justice Series (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2006).
76 Christine Chinkin, "Peace Agreements as a Means for Promoting Gender Equality and Ensuring the 
Participation of Women," UN Division for the Advancement of Women  (2003): 10, cited by Bell and O'Rourke, 
"Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An Introductory Essay," 30.
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practice, men and women enjoy their economic, social and cultural rights on a basis 
of equality. Such steps should include (…) to promote equal representation of men 
and women in public ofÞ ce and decision-making bodies.77 Similarly, the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women emphasised the importance 
of women’s participation in political and public life.78 The Updated Principles on 
Impunity contain a number of principles which insist on women’s participation in 
the decision making around transitional justice.79
A higher number of women participating in decision-making fora should not be 
assumed to automatically translate into transitional justice processes which are 
gender-sensitive at all levels. However, the meaningful inclusion of women in the 
decision-making process does seem to lead to the emergence of different emphases. 
In line with the argument of this paper, Chinkin observed the prioritisation of socio-
economic rights in the agendas emerging from track two peace processes involving 
women’s points of view in Afghanistan, East Timor and Burundi.80
Hence, external donors such as the EU should use their inß uence to insist on 
women’s participation in negotiations around issues of transitional justice. While 
past experience has shown that to improve gender equality, a complexity of issues 
needs to be tackled, a compilation of EU documents pertaining to mainstreaming 
of human rights and gender into European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
is encouraging.81 The 2008 Council of the EU compilation contains reference 
documents on human rights, gender, transitional justice, as well as on civil society. 
In other words, all the ingredients of what has been suggested in this article are part 
of EU documents. It is to be hoped that the commitments will be implemented. In 
May 2009, an analysis of the EU’s role in promoting justice in peacemaking in the 
DRC has concluded that its policy framework lags behind its political statements, 
and practice on the ground.82 Nevertheless, the EU draft document on “Transitional 
77 Social and Cultural Rights Committee on Economic, "General Comment No. 16 (2005), The Equal Right of Men 
and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/2005/4," (2005), para. 21.
78 "UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW General Recommendation No. 23: 
Political and Public Life, 1997,A/52/38."
79 Diane Orentlicher, Impunity: Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat 
Impunity, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Geneva: UN, 2005), Principles 6,7,32,35. 
80 Christine Chinkin, "Peace Processes, Post-Conß ict Security and Guarantees of Women’s Rights: the 
International Context Considered" (paper presented at the 9th Torkel Opsahl Memorial Lecture, Queen’s 
University of Belfast, 2004), cited by Bell and O'Rourke, "Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional 
Justice? An Introductory Essay," 31.
81 Council of the European Union, "Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into European Security and Defence 
Policy: Compilation of Relevant Documents," (2008).
82 Laura Davis, "Small Steps, Large Hurdles: The EU’s Role in Promoting Justice in Peacemaking in the DRC," (IFP 
Mediation Cluster, International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009).
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Justice and ESDP” is a useful starting point for further elaboration.83 It promises 
that the EU will consider developing further guidelines on how transitional justice 
could be taken into account in the context of its policies. While the proposals made 
in the draft document are vague, it is encouraging that there is an explicit statement 
to support collaboration with civil society.84 The same complication of documents 
also “emphasizes the importance of including measures against sexual and gender 
based violence in transitional justice mechanisms”,85 as well as the insistence on 
promoting “the role of women as actors in peace building through their participation 
in peace negotiations as well as establishing transitional governments and 
reconciliation structures.”86
In sum, there are existing EU frameworks to set into motion what is outlined in this 
paper. In order to make the best use of this existing framework, it might be useful for 
the EU to elaborate the draft document on transitional justice and for it to explicitly 
mandate its mediators to include transitional justice in their facilitation. Further, the 
EU could enhance the training of mediators by incorporating an introduction into 
the international legal framework on ESCR. Also, mandating mediators to directly 
engage with civil society at an early stage would certainly be helpful to support 
genuine participation of civil society.
5. Conclusion
Decoding the gendered nature of conß ict and violations committed during a conß ict 
is complicated by the fact that women are often overlooked both as actors and 
victims. This article has argued that if transitional justice embarks on an analysis of 
ESCR, it can potentially contribute to the decoding of gender dimensions of a conß ict 
and therefore pave the ß oor for addressing them. While transitional justice should not 
be expected to solve all problems at once, its mechanisms can spur a debate on how 
to confront the deeper social forces that produce and reinforce gender inequality. 
Since socio-economic conditions and the denial of ESCR have been identiÞ ed as the 
83 Political and Security Committee of the European Union, "Draft Document on Transitional Justice and ESDP, 
in view of the PSC Meeting on 20 June 2006 (doc. 10674/06)," (2006), para. F.. Para F states: “Further 
consideration could be given to ways in which the EU can beneÞ t from the important experience gained by 
NGOs on transitional justice.”
84 European Union, "Enhancing Cooperation with NGOs and CSOs in the Framework of EU Civilian Crisis 
Management and Conß ict Prevention (doc. 15574/1/06)," (2006).
85 ———, "Check list to Ensure Gender Mainstreaming and Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Planning and 
Conduct of ESDP Operations (doc. 12068/06)," (2006), 10.
86 Ibid., Point 1.
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root causes of numerous contemporary conß icts,87 civil society organisations which 
aim to address them in transitional justice should be encouraged and supported. As 
this paper has argued, it is more likely that transitional justice will positively affect 
gender equality if it acknowledges that structural differences have a negative effect 
on women and girls.
87 As mentioned, the Liberian TRC has recently released its Þ rst part of the Þ nal report, arguing that the root 
causes of the violent conß icts were attributable to poverty; greed; corruption; limited access to education; 
economic, social, civil and political inequalities; identity conß ict; land tenure and distribution (Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, "Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia: 
Volume I: Findings and Determinations," 35). See also the Þ ndings of the following recent commissions: Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone, "Witness to Truth: Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission for Sierra Leone: Volume 2: Findings," (2007)., emphasising marginalisation and economic 
injustices as the causes of conß ict, see for instance para. 141 of Volume 2. And: Truth and Reconciliation in 
Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, "Chega! Final Report," in particular p. 141ff on ESCR.
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